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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Francisco Pete Tarin appeals from the district court's Judgment summarily 
dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On appeal, Mr. Tarin contends that 
the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with 
regard to each of his three claims, the evidence was uncontroverted and sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact. Mr. Tarin further contends that the district court 
erred in relying on its memory of the proceedings in dismissing his petition. Therefore, 
under Idaho's post-conviction statute, the district court erred by failing to hold an 
evidentiary hearing. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the erroneous contentions of the State, 
made in its Respondent's Brief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Tarin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
the district court err in sua sponte summarily dismissing Mr. Tarin's Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief where the facts supporting each claim were uncontroverted? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Sua Sponte Summarily Dismissing Mr. Tarin's Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Where The Facts Supporting Each Claim Were Uncontroverted 
Mr. Tarin established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertions that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for telling him that he would receive concurrent 
sentences and probation, for failing to inform the district court at sentencing that an 
alternative sentencing option involving a treatment program had been arranged, and for 
asking the district court to increase Mr. Tarin's sentence at the hearing on Mr. Tarin's 
I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency. In support of his claims, Mr. Tarin submitted evidence in 
the form of a sworn affidavit. There was no evidence submitted which controverted any 
of Mr. Tarin's post-conviction claims as the State did not file an Answer or any affidavits, 
and the district court did not take judicial notice of the underlying file. As such, Mr. Tarin 
certainly should have been allotted an evidentiary hearing on all three of his claims. 
The State cites Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522 (2007), for the proposition 
that "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief 
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do 
not justify relief as a matter of law." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) However, if the petitioner 
presents some shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must 
take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted 
by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968) (holding that the State's motion 
to dismiss was unsupported by any affidavits or depositions, and therefore did not 
"controvert" the facts alleged in the petitioner's application). This is so even if the 
allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. The district court is required to accept 
the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the 
3 
petitioner's conclusion Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). Thus, only 
State controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the 
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct App. 1982). 
The facts of this case are similar to those in Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801 
(1992). In Matthews, there was no answer or motion whatsoever filed by the State and, 
while the district court had only taken "judicial notice" of its recollection of the trial 
proceedings, it had failed to take judicial notice of the court record. Id. at 807. Based 
on the lack of evidence, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, "[i]t follows that there is 
insufficient record and certainly nothing which serves to controvert Matthews' 
allegations." Id. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for 
determination of the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. Id. at 809 
Here, it is uncontested that the State chose not to file an Answer or submit any 
evidence controverting Mr. Tarin's claims. Further, the State did not respond to 
Mr. Tarin's petition or any other pleadings filed in the post-conviction case. Nor did the 
State request that the district court take judicial notice of the record in the underlying 
case. Although the district court made multiple references to its intent to obtain the 
underlying case file, it evidently failed to do so and failed to take judicial notice of its 
contents. (6/18/14 Tr., p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.1, p.9, Ls.1-12; 7/9/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.18-24.) 
Because the district court did not, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the record in the 
underlying case, and the State did not submit an adequate record controverting his 
claims, Mr. Tarin's allegations went unrebutted and summary dismissal of all claims was 
erroneous. 
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The State asserts that "Because the district court addressed Tarin's third claim 
based on underlying facts represented his own post-conviction counsel, Tarin is 
estopped from now asserting that the district court erred by relying solely on its own 
memory of the Rule 35 hearing." (Respondent's Brief, p.22.) The State apparently is 
asserting that because post-conviction counsel quickly summarized what had occurred 
during a prior proceeding in front of the district court, Mr. Tarin may not now assert that 
it was error for the district court to rely on its memory of the proceedings in the 
underlying case. However, post-conviction counsel did not ask the district court to 
neglect to review either an audio recording or a transcript of the proceedings. When it 
became apparent to petitioner's counsel that the district court had not reviewed either 
an audio recording or a transcript of the prior proceedings, counsel helpfully attempted 
to summarize for the court the substance of the hearing and the court's rulings during 
the hearing (7/9/15 Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.13, L.12); however, Mr. Tarin's counsel did not 
ask the district court to rule without first reviewing the record. When it did rule, the 
district court relied both on the representations of Mr. Tarin's counsel, who had listened 
to the audio recording of the I.C.R. 35 hearing, and the district court's own memory of 
what transpired at the LC R. 35 hearing, in dismissing the petition. (6/18/14 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.5-24; 7/9/14 Tr., p. 11, L.25-p.12, L.7; p.15, L.3-p.18, L.13.) 
Finally, case law is clear that such is error as it is not possible for a reviewing 
court to determine the propriety of summary dismissal where no transcript was prepared 
and submitted into evidence. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807-808 (1992) 
(holding that judicial notice of prior reported but not transcribed testimony is not allowed 
because conclusions drawn from that source are incapable of appellate review); c.f 
5 
Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 887 (2007) (holding that the Court was provided 
a transcript of the relevant hearing; judicial notice of the magistrate judge's 
personal recollection of the testimony was proper). 
The district court's erroneous reliance on its memory also applied to Mr. Tarin's 
second claim-trial counsel's failure to explore viable alternatives to incarceration and 
failure to ask the district court for an incarceration alternative. Once again, the district 
court appears to have been relying on its memory in finding that it was a tactical 
decision by trial counsel, "I don't know what - the status of any alternatives that might 
have been in the process of being explored. They were not presented to the Court to 
my recollection." (7/9/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.13-16.) Such was error, as a district court is not 
permitted to rely exclusively upon its own memory of prior proceedings in sua sponte 
dismissing a post-conviction petition. 
Next, the State claims that the district court did apply the correct standard in 
analyzing the second claim of Mr. Tarin's petition. In analyzing Mr. Tarin's claim that his 
counsel failed to present to the district court an alternative sentencing arrangement 
involving inpatient drug/alcohol treatment, the district court concluded, 
... absent a showing that somehow -- or even a representation under 
oath that would meet the threshold prima facie requirement that counsel 
knew of such and that it fell below the community standard of care for a 
defense attorney to ignore that, I can't even entertain a petition for relief in 
that regard. 
(7/9/14 Tr., p.17, Ls.16-22.) The State now asserts that the Strickland standard 
necessitates a community standard of care, i.e., analysis using "standards of practice 
among the community's attorneys." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) 
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The correct standard for evaluating whether an attorney's assistance may have 
ineffective is whether trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard 
reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). 'The proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688. The analysis is not particularized to the practice of law in a certain region 
and the State's claim that the comment related to the "standards of practice among the 
community's attorneys" (Respondent's Brief, p.9), does not mitigate the fact that the 
district court used an incorrect standard in finding Mr. Tarin had not met his burden. 
Where the district court failed to analyze the performance of Mr. Tarin's trial counsel 
utilizing the proper standard, its dismissal of Mr. Tarin's claims was error. Further, 
Mr. Tarin demonstrated deficient performance and asserted prejudice on each of the 
three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.13, 16, 28, 36-37.) 
As for Mr. Tarin's assertion that his counsel promised he would be sentenced to 
probation and concurrent sentences, the State claims that Mr. Tarin's post-conviction 
counsel conceded this issue. (Respondent's Brief, pp 11-13.) However, this is an 
inaccurate summary of counsel's argument. Mr. Tarin's counsel did not advise the 
district court that he was conceding the issue, but apparently advised the district court 
that he was aware of countervailing authority regarding this issue. (7/9/14 Tr., p.16, 
Ls.16-22; R., p.35.) While Mr. Tarin's counsel did acknowledge that if only defense 
counsel assured him that he would get probation, such would not constitute grounds for 
post-conviction relief, a genuine issue of material fact still exists-whether it was only 
defense counsel who made the assurances, or whether the district court and the 
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prosecutor also made similar assurances such as in the case of a binding plea 
agreement pursuant to I.C R. 11 (f)(1 )(e). In this case, the record is devoid of evidence 
indicating that the assurance of leniency was only made by counsel, and not pursuant to 
a plea agreement binding on both the prosecutor and the district court. (7/9/14 
Tr., p.16, Ls.20-22; R., p.35 (citing Walker v. State, 92 Idaho 517, 521 (1968) (holding 
that while an assurance of leniency solely and only by counsel does not constitute 
grounds for post-conviction relief, but noting that the petitioner did not contend that his 
guilty plea was entered upon a commitment from any responsible state official)).) 
Regarding the second claim, counsel's failure to impart to the district court his 
knowledge that Mr. Tarin's family had arranged for an alternative sentence-treatment 
in lieu of incarceration-fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Because 
there is no evidence controverting the petitioner's assertions, and the evidence must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner, it is not clear whether counsel ever 
proposed any alternative to incarceration Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise the 
district court of the available treatment option(s). 
As for the third claim, the State claims that Mr. Tarin's argument should not be 
considered on appeal as "Tarin has not presented any authority to support his argument 
that counsel's attempt to modify his sentences in this manner constituted an attempt to 
increase his sentences." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) However, the State apparently 
ignores the fact that (according to the representations of petitioner's counsel) the district 
court denied the motion, because the court did not believe it had the legal authority to 
increase the sentence from a 2 year fixed to a 3.5 year fixed sentence. (7/9/14 
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, p.12, Ls.8-24.) Thus, the district court's ruling, as summarized by the petitioner's 
provides support for Mr. Tarin's that his counsel asked that the sentence 
increased. And because there is no evidence controverting the petitioner's 
assertions, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
petitioner, it is not clear whether counsel argued a legal impossibility, advocated against 
his client's wishes, or just wasted an opportunity for the district court to consider 
leniency. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
In sum, no evidence was introduced which controverted the attestations 
contained in Mr. Tarin's petition and affidavit The district court had no conflicting 
evidence on which to find that Mr. Tarin had not met his burden or had failed to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact Thus, the district court erred in sua sponte 
summarily dismissing the Petition in its entirety. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tarin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, vacate the judgment, and 
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 2015. 
) 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appe e Public Defender 
g 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of September, 201 I served a 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be 
placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
FRANSCISCO PETE TARIN 
INMATE #57057 
SICI 
PO BOX 8509 
BOISE ID 83707 
JON J SHINDURLING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
JORDAN CRANE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
E~ITHd--
Administrative Assistant 
SJC/eas 
10 
